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mark of the many. It is possible that even Shakespeare may come to life again for many of us who suffered him in high school.

This, of course, is in the public service, but many more doors to community service must be opened.

The constructive use of free time means the active participation of labor in community agencies, both public and voluntary. What better use can we make of our free time than by helping organize the unorganized, than by helping raise their living standards, by fighting against discrimination and segregation, by caring for our young and paying attention to our old, and by helping those who need our help?

And if nothing else works out for us, we can always take a 50-mile walk—or play touch football—or, if we have the money and the time and the inclination, we can just sit in the park, like Bernard Baruch, and think.

This may not be such a bad idea. It is the major purpose of this conference—to get us to think about the implications of free time, to get us to talk about it, and to get us to take a look at our communities.

Let's take a walk—check list in hand: What do we want and why? What is really good and why? What do we need in our community? In education? In recreation? In the arts? In public service? What do we have and what don't we have and why not? What do we do to get what we need and don't have?

And, finally, how do we motivate our fellow workers and fellow citizens to come along and think along and act along with us? Yes; for a better community for all. Yes; for a life of purpose and beauty and dignity—for a truly human life even in the midst of maddening machines.

This, the strengthening of seeing, hearing, feeling, living human beings, is, in the final analysis, the ultimate test of the constructive use of free time.

I must, in conclusion, point to the paradox of our affluent society; on the one hand we worry about the constructive use of free time for the employed, and on the other hand we worry about jobs for the unemployed and public assistance for the needy.

The meaning of our Chicago conference last year and our New York conference this year is that we must worry about both problems—and do something about them.

AN INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON CUBA AND SUBVERSION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Montana [Mr. BATTIN] is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. BATTIN. Mr. Speaker, the following report speaks for itself.

The committee is composed of the following: Representative James F. Battin, Montana, chairman; Representative William C. Cramer, Florida, vice chairman; Representative E. Ross Adair, Indiana; Representative John M. Ashbrook, Ohio; Representative Edward J. Derwinski, Illinois; Representative Samuel L. Devine, Ohio; Representative Durward G. Hall, Missouri; Representative Clark MacGregor, Minnesota; Representative Garner E. Shriver, Kansas; and William B. Prendergast, Ph. D., research.

Today is the 61st anniversary of Cuban independence.

The recently issued interim report of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Armed Services dealing with the

Cuban military buildup throws light on hitherto obscure aspects of the Cuban situation during the summer and fall of 1962. Consequently, this unanimous report of a subcommittee composed of four Democrats and three Republicans is an important first step toward better understanding of the background of American policy during that crucial period. Its appraisal of past errors and present dangers sounds an emphatic warning to those responsible for formulating policy toward Cuba.

IMPORTANT FINDINGS OF THE REPORT

In reviewing past policy, the subcommittee found that a creditable job was done in collecting information about the military buildup in Cuba by what it calls the intelligence community, but that "several substantial errors were made in the evaluation of information." Among such errors were the following:

The number of Soviet troops in Cuba was substantially underestimated. . . .

Indications that strategic missiles were being installed were not given proper weight. . . .

There also appeared to be a tendency . . . to discredit and downgrade refugee and exile reports.

The analysts were strongly influenced by their philosophical judgment that it would be contrary to Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba.

DISTURBING WARNINGS

The subcommittee has unanimously reported great concern and grave apprehension about reports that "strategic missiles and bombers were not removed from Cuba but are concealed in caves and otherwise." It noted that the evidence Government spokesmen rely on when they give categorical assurances that all such weapons have been removed from Cuba is the same kind of evidence which led these same spokesmen to assert prior to last October 14 that no "offensive weapons" had been brought into Cuba. In the words of the subcommittee, it is largely "the negative evidence that there is no affirmative proof to the contrary."

On the matter of the Soviet presence in Cuba, the subcommittee reported a lack of confidence within the intelligence community in their own estimates of foreign troops in Cuba. It flatly declared, "No one—outside of Soviet and Cuban official circles—knows how many Russian troops are there now." It found that the amount of Russian military equipment known to be in Cuba suggests that the current official estimate of 17,500 is too low.

One of the most disturbing statements made by the subcommittee is the assertion that "the intelligence community does not believe it yet has sufficient concrete evidence to estimate any reduction in overall Soviet military capability on the island."

Perhaps the most valuable part of the subcommittee's report is the enumeration of 11 considerations that lead it to conclude that Cuba now represents a grave threat to our national security. This is a needed antidote to the plethora of statements from official and unofficial spokesmen of the administration designed to minimize, and divert attention from, the seriousness of the Cuban problem.

We hope that these words of the subcommittee's report—again the unanimous judgment of its members—will be heard throughout the land:

The matter of basic and fundamental importance . . . and the source of the real threat, is that international communism now has a firm foothold in this hemisphere and that, if we permit it to do so, it is here to stay.

By [a] process of erosion our neighbors to the south may fall nation by nation until the entire hemisphere is lost and the Communist goal of isolating the United States has been attained.

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE REPORT

The report has three important implications which seem to us inescapable.

The first is that administration spokesmen have been guilty of misinforming the public about Cuba. In bringing this fact to light, the subcommittee has rendered a valuable service in unmanaging the news.

The second implication is that a change in the intelligence process is required. A system under which facts are not given sufficient weight when they fail to jibe with a preconceived theory of how the Soviet Union is going to behave, under which the limitations of aerial photography seem not to be recognized, and under which the customary military practice in evaluating intelligence is reversed imposes a dangerous myopia on intelligence agencies.

The third implication of the report is that a change of policy toward Cuba is urgently needed. Patting ourselves on the back for the "victory" of last October, putting a stop to Cuban exile raids, issuing optimistic statements about the cost of the Soviet operation in Cuba, and hopefully waiting for Castro's downfall are not enough.

THE PUBLIC MISINFORMATION PROGRAM

In the appendix to this report are listed a few instances of misinformation from responsible administration spokesmen on the subject of Cuba. There, in parallel columns, will be found statements of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee side by side with conflicting pronouncements of administration officials.

We are content simply to present the facts in this matter without speculating about the administration's motives in these instances. But we do feel most strongly that misinforming the public about the nature and the gravity of the danger in Cuba is a practice that strikes at the very vitals of our system of Government. For the American form of government is one which offers to the people the tremendous responsibility of determining the course and direction of public policy, and this is a responsibility which can be exercised only if complete and accurate information is made available to the public.

The subcommittee reports that intelligence analysts had reached the conclusion in late September 1962 "that there was a suspect medium-range ballistic missile site in Pinar del Rio Province."

Yet administration spokesmen insisted repeatedly in late September and throughout the first 20 days of October that there was no evidence of offensive weapons in Cuba.

This is what McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security, told the Nation on October 14, 1962 by television:

I know there is no present evidence, and I think there is no present likelihood that the Cubans and the Cuban Government and the Soviet Government would in combination attempt to install a major offensive capability.

It is ironic that, several hours before Mr. Bundy spoke, photographs of medium-range missile sites had been taken in the San Cristobal area. Mr. Bundy could not have known for sure what these photographs were to reveal. But, for at least 3 weeks before October 14, there was evidence of the presence of strategic missiles in Cuba—evidence which identified their location and which directed the flight of October 14 to the very area which yielded the photographic proof.

Further, 5 days before Mr. Bundy's television appearance, our intelligence had positively established by photographic evidence the presence in Cuba of an offensive capability in the form of the Soviet bomber, the IL-28. This fact was made known to the Nation by Secretary McNamara in his telethon of February 6, 1963.

Another example of the peddling of misinformation by a responsible administration spokesman is the assertion of Secretary McNamara on February 6 that he had "no evidence that Cuba is being used as a base for subversion directed against other Latin American countries."

As though in direct reply to the Secretary, the Preparedness Subcommittee declares, "the evidence is overwhelming that Castro is supporting, spurring, aiding and abetting Communist revolutionary and subversive movements throughout the Western Hemisphere."

One more example out of many will suffice. In an article in the Washington World of October 19, 1962, George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State, wrote:

About 4,500 Soviet military specialists have arrived in Cuba, including construction men and technicians.

On October 29, 1962, the Department of Defense published a brochure entitled "Cuba" in which the number of Soviet personnel on the island was estimated as 5,000. However, the Preparedness Subcommittee reports that the intelligence community on October 22 "estimated the Soviet personnel in Cuba to be 8,000 to 10,000."

One who works his way through the tangle of official administration pronouncements from last August to the present time on the numbers and the character of Soviet personnel in Cuba will be surprised to learn from the Preparedness Subcommittee that "no one—outside of Soviet and Cuban official circles—knows how many Russian troops are there now."

For the administration almost always spoke as though it knew, although its figures changed inexplicably from time to time. It has frequently sniped at estimates offered by others on the ground that they could not possibly be as well informed as the administration's intelligence agencies.

It is hard to escape the conclusion that there has been deception of the public in official and quasi-official pronouncements dealing with the type and numbers of Soviet personnel in Cuba. In order to deceive, it is not necessary to tell a falsehood. When an estimate from our intelligence sources is presented to the public without explaining that the intelligence community itself has little confidence in the estimate, this is deception. When Soviet personnel are called technicians as they arrive in Cuba but are called troops as they leave, this is deception. When the reports of Cuban exiles are shrugged off with a blanket dismissal of exile sources as unreliable, this is deception.

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

The report of the Preparedness Subcommittee raises several questions which it does not answer.

It attributes to "the intelligence community" responsibility for the shocking inadequacies in the evaluation of information about the Soviet military buildup in Cuba. The question who in the intelligence community was responsible remains unanswered.

Apparently it was not John McCone, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, for the record shows that on August 10, 1962, Mr. McCone reported his belief that the Soviet Union was "preparing to place offensive missiles in Cuba."

Despite the views of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Preparedness Subcommittee declares, "The intelligence people apparently invariably adopted the most optimistic estimate possible with respect to the information available." This method of interpretation, the subcommittee continues, "is in sharp contrast to the customary military practice of emphasizing the worst situation which might be established by the accumulation of evidence."

It is hard to understand why intelligence specialists would reverse their customary rules of interpretation in evaluating information about the Soviet buildup in Cuba. It is our understanding that the intelligence agencies reach conclusions about the location and strength of North Vietnamese forces in southeast Asia on the basis of the kind of evidence that was available long before October 14, 1962 about the presence of Soviet troops and missiles in Cuba.

Who was responsible for applying information about Cuba rules of interpretation far stricter than those normally applied by intelligence agencies? Who were the Kremlinologists who concluded that the Soviet Union would never place missiles in Cuba, whose preconceptions controlled "the weighing of the facts?"

We cannot adopt the casual attitude of some spokesman in the Senate toward the dangerous errors in the intelligence process when he says "We must allow a margin for error." Given the gravity of the peril that faced this Nation last October and the danger that confronts it today, we cannot dismiss shocking deficiencies with an "Oh well, mistakes will happen."

Nor do we think it fair to attribute in a vague way to the whole "intelligence community" responsibility for these mistakes. We have too much confidence in the great body of specialists who make up the intelligence community to believe that they all were guilty of the peculiar blindness described in the report of the preparedness subcommittee.

In order to maintain public confidence in the intelligence agencies, to do justice to those who were not involved in the blunders of last fall, and to avoid recurrence of these errors, a more specific statement of where responsibility lies for these mistakes should be given by the Preparedness Subcommittee.

Yet another unanswered question is what degree of credibility should responsible officials have given to the human source reports that Soviet troops and missiles were in Cuba, which were received well before the administration regarded such information as confirmed. We believe that the preparedness subcommittee can indicate whether the sources of these reports were reliable without running the risks of identifying the sources.

Finally, a clearer explanation of the process of calculating the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba is needed. The current intelligence estimate is that 22,000 were there last October. Eight to nine thousand are said to have been withdrawn, with the result that 17,500 remain. The preparedness subcommittee comments that "technical reasons" account for what would seem to be an error in subtraction. We are baffled by this peculiar arithmetic.

APPENDIX

(Inconsistencies between findings of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee and administration statements)

THE ADMINISTRATION

1. "I have no evidence that Cuba is being used as a base for subversion directed against other Latin American countries. It is a matter that is of constant interest to us and one we are monitoring continuously."

(Department of Defense, Special Cuba Briefing by Hon. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, February 6, 1963, p. 47.)

2. "I know there is no present evidence and I think there is no present likelihood that the Cubans and the Cuban Government and the Soviet Government would in combination attempt to install a major offensive capability. So far, everything that has been delivered in Cuba falls within the categories of aid which the Soviet Union has provided, for example, to neutral states like Egypt, or Indonesia."

THE SENATE PREPAREDNESS SUBCOMMITTEE

1. "The evidence is overwhelming that Castro is supporting, spurring, aiding, and abetting Communist revolutionary and subversive movements throughout the Western Hemisphere and that such activities present a grave and ominous threat to the peace and security of the Americas." (Interim report, p. 7.)

2. "After mid-September some reports of missiles being introduced into Cuba were suggestive enough of strategic or offensive weapons to arouse the suspicions of intelligence analysts. This resulted in the conclusion—apparently reached near the end of September, 1962—that there was a suspect medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) site in Pinar del Rio Province. As a result, photographic coverage of the suspect area

THE ADMINISTRATION

(Issues and answers: ABC McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security, interviewed by Edward P. Morgan, and John Scall, Oct. 14, 1962.)

3. "There are today no offensive weapons systems in Cuba."

(Department of Defense, Special Cuba Briefing by Hon. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, February 6, 1963, p. 38.)

"* * * I do want to leave no doubt in your minds. I am satisfied that there are no offensive weapons systems in Cuba, and I am satisfied of this beyond any reasonable doubt."

(Department of Defense, Special Cuba Briefing by Hon. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, February 6, 1963, p. 45.)

4. "We have no evidence of troops * * * we do not have information that troops have come into Cuba * * *"
(President Kennedy at press conference, Aug. 29, 1962.)

5. Question. "Mr. Secretary * * * in view of the fact we didn't know when and how the offensive missiles got into Cuba, no photographs, we were surprised, how do we know that only 42 came in and that 42 went out?"

Secretary McNAMARA. "As you know, we covered the entire island of Cuba with fine-resolution photography, analyzed every foot of it several times, located 42 missiles, and their associated equipment, balanced the missiles against the type of equipment, accounted for all of the equipment and all of the missiles leaving Cuba * * *"

(Department of Defense, special Cuba briefing by Hon. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, Feb. 6, 1963, p. 46.)

6. "Some 5,000 Soviet personnel are located throughout the island in major industrial and military installations."

(Cuba: Questions and answers, Oct. 29, 1962, p. 11, Department of Defense pamphlet.)

THE SENATE PREPAREDNESS SUBCOMMITTEE

was proposed and on October 14, a Strategic Air Command U-2 reconnaissance aircraft overflew the area and emerged with hard photographic evidence of the San Cristobal medium-range ballistic missile complex."

(Interim report, p. 12.)

3. "Strategic weapons may or may not be now in Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of the lack of conclusive evidence."

(Interim report, p. 7.)

"Reports of Concealed Strategic Weapons in Cuba

"The intelligence community, although aware of these reports, have been unable to confirm them and adhere to the position that all strategic weapons are withdrawn."

"It is fair to say, however, that this is a matter of great concern to the intelligence community."

"Based on skepticism, if nothing else, there is grave apprehension on this score. It is agreed that iron-clad assurance of the complete absence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba can come only as a result of thorough, penetrating onsite inspection by reliable observers. The current intelligence estimate that they are not present is based largely on the negative evidence that there is no affirmative proof to the contrary. This of course, was precisely the status of the matter prior to last October 14."

"There is no doubt that there are literally thousands of caves and caverns in Cuba and that it is feasible to use many of these for the storage and concealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. It is also true that military activity has been observed in connection with these caves. Our intelligence people are of the opinion that some of the caves are in fact utilized for the storage of military items and equipment other than strategic missiles, such as ammunition, explosives, etc."

(Interim report, pp. 28-29.)

4. (Speaking of "the July-August period" 1962) "Human source reports also alleged that the nature and character of the arriving Soviet personnel had changed significantly. It was reported that some of the arriving personnel during this period were primarily young, trim, physically fit, suntanned and disciplined, and that they formed in ranks of fours on the docks and moved out in truck convoys. Refugee, exile, and other human source reports suggested that, in contrast to the earlier arrivals, the new arrivals were Soviet combat troops. However, the intelligence community adhered to the view that they were military instructors, advisers, and trainers, plus a number of civilian technicians and advisers associated with improving the Cuban economy."

(Interim report, p. 10-11.)

5. "Photographic reconnaissance was unable to detect precisely how many ballistic missiles were introduced into Cuba. Prior to the Soviet announcement that 42 missiles would be withdrawn, our photographs had revealed a lesser number. It could not be established, therefore, how many ballistic missiles were, in fact, introduced into Cuba."

(Interim report, p. 13.)

8. "* * * on October 22, 1962, the date that the President addressed the Nation, the intelligence community estimated the Soviet personnel in Cuba to be 8,000 to 10,000."

(Interim report, p. 14.)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee on the Judiciary may be permitted to sit during general debate on May 22, 23, and 24.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Mexico?

Mr. MORSE. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Speaker, may I ask the purpose of the meetings?

Mr. MORRIS. I cannot tell the purpose of the committee meetings. I am making the request at the request of the chairman of the full committee, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Celler].

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Mexico?

There was no objection.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on the Judiciary be permitted to sit during general debate on Wednesday, May 22, and Thursday, May 23. I do this at the request of the gentleman from New York [Mr. Celler].

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Mexico?

Mr. MORSE. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Speaker, can the gentleman tell me if the minority members have been consulted on this request?

Mr. MORRIS. I cannot answer that. I just do not know. I assume the minority members have been consulted. That is the custom.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Mexico?

There was no objection.

THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

(Mr. JONES of Alabama (at the request of Mr. MORRIS) was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and include an address by the President of the United States.)

Mr. JONES of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, last Saturday was a great day for public acknowledgment of water resources development which is so vital to our Nation. The 30th anniversary of the Tennessee Valley Authority which has contributed mightily to the progress and welfare of the Nation and the Southeast was celebrated at Muscle Shoals. The President of the United States attended the ceremony and delivered a significant address marking 30 years of advancement by TVA. Following is the text of the President's remarks at Muscle Shoals:

PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ON TVA

Thirty years ago today a dream came true. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt—in the presence of TVA's two patron saints, George Norris, of Nebraska, and Lister Hill, of Alabama—signed his name to one of the most unique legislative measures ever enacted by the Congress. That simple ceremony ended a struggle which had gone on for more than a decade. It gave life to a measure which had been vetoed on two previous occasions. But in reality, it was only a beginning.

For no other Federal agency has ever tried to combine the power of Government with the flexibility of private enterprise. No other effort had ever been made to fit the patterns of public administration to the comprehensive needs of one valley. No other Government agency had ever established its headquarters away from Washington, close to the problems and the people, and responsible directly to the President and Congress. And no one—no one in Washington and no one in the Tennessee Valley—knew whether this effort could ever overcome the forces of poverty and despair and destruction which had devastated this region for so long.

IT HAS BEEN DONE

There were many, moreover, who still regarded the whole undertaking with doubt, with scorn or with outright hostility. Some said it couldn't be done. Some said it shouldn't be done. Some said it wouldn't be done. But today, 30 years later, it has been done—and there is still more for TVA to do.

For none of the dire predictions of 30 years ago has come true. They predicted that the Government was too inefficient to electrify this valley. But TVA, by any objective test, is not only the largest but one of the best managed power systems in the country.

They predicted that a Federal regional corporation would undermine the role of State and local governments. But the State and local governments in this valley today are thriving and strengthened—for example, hundreds of State and local park and recreational areas have been developed on the land made available by TVA.

They predicted that TVA would destroy private and local initiative and thwart free enterprise. But private investment in job-creating industries along what was once a useless, dangerous river has already surpassed the total public investment required to control its waters.

Thirty years ago, the experts were doubtful, too. Specialists in agriculture contended that farmers bound by tradition would not use the new types of fertilizer. But the ingenuity of Muscle Shoals has drastically transformed farming all over this country and all over the world.

THOUSANDS AT WORK

Forest technicians claimed that vast reforestation could not be accomplished by private landowners. But thousands of men are working today in pulp mills and furniture factories and woodlands all traceable to the tiny tree seedlings provided to the valley's farmers by TVA.

Experts in engineering testified that multipurpose dams would not work, that no river could be developed for navigation and the generation of electricity and prevent floods at the same time. But barge traffic in this system has grown from less than 33 million ton miles in 1933 to more than 2 billion ton miles today, on rivers spanned by more than 30 dams that are protecting lives and land and contributing to the Nation's largest single supply of electric power.

There were specialists in conservation in those days who claimed that fish and wildlife would be destroyed by the TVA; experts in power production who claimed that the people of this valley could not use so many kilowatts; experts in fiscal affairs who were certain that the Federal investment would be wasted and never repaid. But the fish and water fowl have thrived—the families of this previously power-deficit region now use more than twice as many kilowatt-hours a year as the rest of the Nation—and last

year over 65 billion kilowatt-hours of energy were produced for use in a region that used only 1.6 billion in 1933. The savings from navigation and flood control already are greater than their cost to the Government—and the TVA power system is financially self-sufficient, making a repayment to the Treasury from its proceeds each year.

Yet, despite this record of success, TVA still has its skeptics and its critics. There are still those who call it creeping socialism, and a particularly ugly advertising campaign even implied recently that TVA and public power were comparable to the Berlin wall and the East Berlin police as threats to our freedom. But the tremendous economic growth of this region, its private industry and its private income, make it clear to all that TVA is a fitting answer to socialism—and it certainly has not been creeping.

There are still those who complain that this national asset serves only the people of this valley. But flood regulation by the TVA benefits the lower Ohio and Mississippi Valleys as well. Its navigable waterway system has opened up this inland region as a market for 20 States. Its new kinds of plant food have increased production and decreased costs for farmers all over the country. Its phosphorous production was essential to our Armed Forces in the Second World War. And, surely, the power lines serving the Atomic Energy Commission at Oak Ridge and the Redstone Arsenal at Huntsville are serving the entire Nation. As a final example of its national role, I would cite to you the more than 2,000 pilgrims to TVA who come from other lands—the kings and the prime ministers, the students and the technicians—the undecided and the uncommitted who gain here an impression of growth and vitality and concern for human well-being which cannot be matched anywhere else in the world.

Finally, there are those who say that the TVA has finished its job and outlived its challenge. But all of the essential roles of TVA remain, their importance increasing as the importance of this area's atomic energy, military and commercial activities increases. And new opportunities, new frontiers to explore, are opening up every year—including work on the smaller upstream tributaries—reclaiming land scarred by coal strip mining—new types of national recreational areas—and new studies of flood land zoning and planning, to name but a few.

WILL NEVER BE OVER

In short, the work of TVA will never be over. There will always be new frontiers for it to conquer. For in the minds of men the world over, the initials TVA stand for progress—and the people of this area are not afraid of progress.

TVA also stands for cooperation—cooperation between public and private enterprise—between upstream and downstream interests—between those concerned with power and navigation, flood control and recreation—and, above all, cooperation between the Federal Government and the seven States of this area.

From time to time, statements are made labeling the Federal Government an outsider, an intruder, an adversary. In any free federation of states, of course differences will arise and difficulties will persist. But the people of this area know that the Federal Government is not a stranger or an enemy. It is the people of 50 States joining in a national effort to seek progress in every State.

For without the National Government, there could be no TVA.

Without the National Government there could be no protection of the family farmer,

his income, and his financial independence. For he would never have been able on his own to electrify his farm, to insure his crop, to support its price, and to stay ahead of the bugs, the boll weevils, and the mortgage.

Without the National Government, there could be no school lunch and special milk programs for his children, no assistance on conserving his soil or harvesting his trees, no loan to help him buy his farm and no security at the bank.

Without the National Government there could be no Coosa-Alabama River project, with the first dam underway this month at Miller's Ferry.

Without the National Government there could be no Hill-Burton hospitals, no assistance to rural libraries, no help to college dormitories, no control of water pollution or assistance to depressed areas or help for training teachers.

THE POSITIVE SIDE

The list goes on and on. Only a national effort can explore the mysteries of outer space, harvest the products of ocean depths and mobilize the human, natural, and material resources of our land. I cite these examples—not to show the growth of Federal activity, for it is still small compared to the Nation's—but to show the positive side of Federal-State cooperation, of which TVA is an outstanding symbol.

For this is and always must be "one Nation under God, indivisible." Franklin Roosevelt was from Hyde Park, N.Y., more than 1,100 miles away from Muscle Shoals. George Norris was from McCook, Nebr., also more than 1,100 miles away. But they knew that the conquest of floods and poverty in this valley was not a local or regional problem. It required the best efforts of the Nation—and they were not afraid to direct the power and the purpose of the Federal Government toward a solution of these national problems.

I have read much of George Norris, the "gentle knight" from Nebraska—and his favorite phrase, recurring throughout all his speeches, was his reference—and his dedication—to "generations yet unborn." The first of those generations is now enjoying the fruits of his labor, as will others for decades to come. So let us all, whether we are public officials or private citizens, northerners or southerners, farmers or city dwellers, live up to the ideas and the ideals of George Norris—and resolve that we, too, in our time, will build a better Nation for "generations yet unborn."

RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO SEVENTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, WASHINGTON

(Mr. STINSON (at the request of Mr. MORSE) was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. STINSON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to draw to the attention of my colleagues the results of my recent questionnaire, which was sent to 55,945 constituents in the Seventh Congressional District of the State of Washington. To date, 5,293 questionnaires have been completed and returned by constituents. This excellent response indicates to me that the people of my district are concerned about good sound government and are willing to express their views on the important issues of the day.

Following are the results of the questionnaire: